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THE CESSATION OF PRODUCTION CLAUSE
AND LESS THAN PAYING PRODUCTION IN
THE SECONDARY TERM: HOYT V
CONTINENTAL OIL CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently considered, in Hoyt v.
Continental Oil Co. ,' whether an oil and gas lease in its secondary
term2 terminated by the terms of a cessation of production clause3
where there was less than production in paying quantities4 and when
the habendum clause5 required such production. Only three cases6
have previously addressed this issue. Of these cases, only one7 consti-
tuted legal precedent. In Hoyt, the supreme court held that, after the
expiration of the primary term,8 where a cessation of production clause
modified a habendum clause requiring production in paying quantities,
the oil and gas lease terminated if cessation of production in paying
quantities had been established and if there was less than production in
paying quantities for more than the stipulated time period of the cessa-
tion of production clause. 9 Significantly, Texas and Oklahoma, the first
states to apply this rule,10 have previously interpreted the habendum
clause of an oil and gas lease to require production in paying quantities
in the secondary term even where the express language in the haben-
1. 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980).
2. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 20 & 21 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 47 & 49 infra for two definitions of production in paying quantities.
5. See notes 12 & 14 infra and accompanying text.
6. All of these cases are from Texas. Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959);
Wainright v. Wainright, 359 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ refn.ir.e.; Sullivan & Garnett
v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 ('ex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref n~r.e.
7. Sullivan & Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref. n.r.e.
8. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
9. Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co., 606 P.2d at 563. The Oklahoma Supreme Court also dis-
posed of three other issues. The court held that contract negotiations and internal corporate au-
thorization to rework did not constitute operations for drilling as required by the cessation of
production clause in the Hoyt lease. Id at 564. See note 74 infra. The court held that the shut-in
gas well doctrine had no application where there had not been completion and testing of a gas
well capable of production in paying quantities. Id at 565. See note 67 infra. The court held that
the time after the filing of the petition in this action did not constitute non-productive time for the
purpose of this action. Id at 562. See note 66 infra.
10. The rule was first applied in Sullivan & Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (rex. Civ.
App. 1957), writ ref nir.e.
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dum clause referred only to the term "production."'I
II. CESSATION OF PRODUCTION PRIOR TO HOYT V
CONTINENTAL OIL CO.
A. Characterizing the Habendum Clause
The habendum clause of an oil and gas lease defines the duration
of the leasehold interest12 but may be subject to other provisions.' 3
Under the typical oil and gas lease, the habendum clause provides for a
fixed primary term and also includes a provision known as the thereaf-
ter clause, which provides that the lease shall continue after the expira-
tion of the primary term so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced.'
4
The estate created is a determinable fee.'5 Consequently, where the
primary term has expired, the lease will remain in effect only by the
terms of the thereafter clause.' 6 In Oklahoma and other states, 7 if the
terms of the thereafter clause are not satisfied then the lease will termi-
nate. No element of forfeiture exists, however, since policy interests
suggest that a lease terminates by its own terms. 8 In addition, the
11. Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942).
12. E. KUNTZ, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.1 (12th rev. ed. 1964); H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 601.4 (abr. ed. 1975).
13. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 602 (abr. ed. 1975). Though the ha-
bendum clause may be subject to the provisions of other oil and gas lease clauses, we arc here
concerned only with the effect of a cessation of production clause upon a habendum clause.
14. E. KUNTZ, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.4 (12th rev. ed. 1964); H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 601.4 (abr. ed. 1975). The thereafter clause pro-
vides for a secondary term after the expiration of the primary term for so long thereafter as oil or
gas is produced.
15. In those instances in which the courts [California, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Oklahoma] have had occasion to identify by name the estate created by such an oil
and gas lease, the interest created has been identified as a determinable fee where the
lease provided for a fixed term and for so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced.
E. KUNTZ, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.2, at 246-47 (12th rev. ed. 1964).
16. Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Woodruff v. Brady, 72 P.2d 709 (Okla. 1937);
Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Okla. 1926).
17. Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Montana, Tennessee, Texas. For case authority in these
states see note 29 infra and accompanying text.
18. Haby v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1954); McQueen v. Sun Oil Co.,
213 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1954). In Haby v. Stanolind Oil Co., the United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, stated: "There is no principal [sic] of forfeiture involved when a lease is terminated
by its own provisions for cessation of production." 228 F.2d at 307 (quoting Woodson v. Pruett,
281 S.W.2d 159 at 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), writ ref nr.e.). Among other cases, this particular
quote from Woodson was supported by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Saunders, 22 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1927). Haby v. Stanolind 1/I Co,
quoted Empire Gas to this effect: "[The] equitable rule as to relieving against forfeiture has no
application to the facts of this case, for there was no forfeiture; there was nothing to be forfeited,
because the lease by its very terms had ceased to exist." 228 F.2d at 305 (quoting Empire Gas &
Fuel Co. v. Saunders, 22 F.2d at 735).
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same result is warranted by policy interests which construe an oil and
gas lease liberally in favor of the lessor and strictly against the lessee. 19
B. Characterizing the Cessation of Production Clause
The cessation of production clause in an oil and gas lease provides
a lessee with certain rights for maintaining the lease should production
cease. 20 A typical cessation of production clause may read in part:
"(I)f after discovery of oil or gas the production thereof should cease
from any cause, this lease shall not terminate if lessee commences addi-
tional drilling or reworking operations within sixty (60) days therafter
. ,,*"21 Where such a clause is absent, and there is temporary cessa-
tion of production, a lessee may be allowed a reasonable time in which
to reinstate production under the common law doctrine of temporary
cessation.22 But where a cessation of production clause is present, the
stipulated time period of a cessation of production clause generally
defeats the doctrine of temporary cessation.23 Cessation of production
then, which exceeds the period stipulated in a cessation of production
clause, cannot be considered temporary under the doctrine of tempo-
rary cessation since it is superseded by the terms of the cessation of
production clause.24
C. Interpreting the Term Production
To determine whether a lease terminates by the terms of its cessa-
tion of production clause, it has been necessary to define the term pro-
duction with respect to both the habendum and the cessation of
19. Greer v. Salmon, 479 P.2d 294 (N.M. 1970) which said: "A lessee cannot be permitted to
fail in development and hold the lease for speculative purposes unless in strict compliance with his
contract .. " Id at 296. Furthermore, Greer v. Salmon stated: "Frequently this court has con-
strued oil and gas mining leases strictissimi juris as against the lessee and liberally in favor of the
lessor. But this has always been to the end of promoting development as contemplated by the
parties." Id at 299 (quoting Simons v. McDaniel, 7 P.2d 419, 421 (Okla. 1932)).
Lima Oil & Gas Co. v. Pritchard, 218 P. 863 (Okla. 1923); New State Oil & Gas Co. v. Dunn,
182 P. 514 (Okla. 1919).
20. E. KUNTZ, 4 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 47.3(a) (13th rev. ed. 1972).
21. Hazlett, Effect of Temporary Cessation of Production on Leases and Term Royalties,
TENTH ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX., 201, 248 (1959).
22. Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1958); E. KuTwrz, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS § 26.8 (12th rev. ed. 1964).
23. Woodson v. Pruett, 281 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), writ ref nr.e. (involved an oil
and gas lease that terminated by reason of cessation of production for more than the sixty days
allowed in a cessation of production clause).
24. But cf Wilson v. Talbert, 535 S.W.2d 807 (Ark. 1976) (force majeure clause allowed
applicability of doctrine of temporary cessation where a cessation of production clause would
have precluded such an application).
19801
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production clauses since this term appears in each clause.2" After the
expiration of the primary term, production has generally been defined
as production in paying quantities2 6 because policy suggests that a
lessee should not be allowed to maintain a lease in the secondary term
for purely speculative reasons. 27 As such, production in less than pay-
ing quantities will generally terminate a lease in its secondary term.
Specifically, in Oklahoma2 8 and other states,29 the term production, as
contained in a habendum clause, is interpreted to mean production in
paying quantities because that word is typically contained within a ha-
bendum clause only by virtue of the thereafter clause, which has appli-
cation only to the secondary term.
Before the expiration of the primary term, production has gener-
ally been defined as any production,3" and not just production in pay-
ing quantities. This definition affords the lessee with an opportunity to
explore and develop the leasehold during the primary term.3" As such,
complete cessation of production has been required to terminate a lease
in its primary term. Consequently, a cessation of production clause
containing the term production will have no effect on a primary term
lease until there is complete cessation of production.32 There is no au-
25. See notes 14 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 47 & 49 infra for two definitions of production in paying quantities.
27. See note 18 supra.
28. State v. Carter Oil Co., 336 P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1959); Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla.
1954); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Okla. 1926).
29. McLeon v. Wells, 180 S.W.2d 325 (Ark. 1944); Barnard v. Gibson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 527,
224 P.2d 90 (1950); Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 108 So. 314 (La. 1926); Steven v. Potlatch Oil &
Ref. Co., 260 P. 119 (Mont. 1927); Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co. Inc., 551 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn.
1977); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942). Accord, Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Moxely, 211 F.2d
916 (5th Cir. 1954).
30. For an oil or gas well to be defined as producing, there must be some quantity of oil or
gas coming from the well. E.g., Roberts v. Corum, 112 So.2d 550 (Miss. 1959); Long v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 89 N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 1958); Murphy v. Garfield Oil Co., 225 P. 676 (Okla. 1923).
31. Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942) stated:
In order to understand and properly interpret the language used by the parties, we
must consider the objects and purposes intended to be accomplished by them in entering
into the contract. The object of the contract was to secure development of the property
for the mutual benefit of the parties. It was contemplated that this would be done during
the primary period of the contract. So far as the lessees were concerned, the object in
providing for a continuation of the lease for an indefinite time after the expiration of the
primary period was to allow the lessees to reap the full fruits of the investments made by
them in developing the property. Obviously, if the lease could no longer be operated at a
profit, there were no fruits for them to reap. The lessors should not be required to suffer
a continuation of the lease after the expiration of the primary period merely for specula-
tion purposes on the part of the lessees. Since the lease was no longer yielding a profit to
the lessees at the termination of the primary period, the object sought to be accomplished
by the continuation thereof had ceased, and the lease had terminated.
Id at 512.
32. Roberts v. Corum, 112 So.2d 550 (Miss. 1959); Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 89
4
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thority indicating a secondary term cessation of production clause to be
activated only by a complete cessation of production. One authority33
though, has held that cessation of paying production will activate the
cessation of production clause in the secondary term. Generally, the
cessation of production clause modifies the thereafter clause in a secon-
dary term lease.34 Consequently, where the term production in a cessa-
tion of production clause is construed to require complete cessation of
production in the secondary term before a lease may terminate, an im-
portant issue arises where production in the thereafter clause is con-
strued to mean paying production.
Where a secondary term oil and gas lease contains a cessation of
production clause, and it modifies the habendum clause, there is cessa-
tion of paying production under the cessation of production clause if
the habendum clause requires paying production but such requirement
is not met.35 Cessation of production in paying quantities, not neces-
sarily complete cessation, is required for termination. Professor Eu-
gene Kuntz has stated it this way:
If production should not cease entirely but should cease to
be in paying quantities, there may or may not be a cessation
of production for purposes of the cessation of production
clause, depending upon whether the effect is to modify the
habendum clause or the drilling clause. Thus, if the primary
term has expired and the effect of the cessation of production
clause is to modify the habendum clause, there is a cessation
of production if the habendum clause requires production in
paying quantities and production has ceased to be in paying
quantities.36
Sullivan & Garnett v. James37 is the only legal precedent supporting this
N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 1958). Contra, Mitchell v. Brockenbush, 363 S.W.2d 166 (rex. Civ. App. 1962),
writ ref n.r.e.
33. Sullivan & Gamett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 ('rex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref n.r.e.
34. McQueen v. Sun Oil Co., 213 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1954).
Wainright v. Wainright, 359 S.W.2d 628 (rex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref .r.e.; Sullivan &
Gamett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (rex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref nr.e.
35. Sullivan & Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (rex. Civ. App. 1957), writ refn.r.e.; cf.
McQueen v. Sun Oil Co., 213 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1954) (where neither the sixty-day cessation of
production clause nor the habendum clause were satisfied in the secondary term when there were
no operations designed to restore production within sixty days of total cessation of production);
Wainright v. Wainright, 359 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref ar.e. (where the court,
without referring to the terms of the habendum clause, declared the lease to be terminated by the
express terms of the cessation of production clause pursuant to total cessation of production).
36. E. KUNTZ, 4 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAs § 47.3, at 105 (13th rev. ed.
1972).
37. 308 S.W.2d 891 (rex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref n.r.c
1980]
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proposition.3 8 Sullivan & Garnett involved a lease which produced oil,
but not in paying quantities. The habendum clause was interpreted to
require production in paying quantities.3 9 However, the language of
the cessation of production clause contained only the term produc-
tion.4 0 The jury determined that production in paying quantities had
ceased at the end of June by taking the difference between the receipts
and expenditures for the first six months of 1952.4 1 The court of ap-
peals in Sullivan & Garnett upheld the trial court's finding that cessa-
tion in paying quantities continued for a period exceeding the sixty day
allowance in the cessation of production clause.42 The principles appli-
cable to defining production in a habendum clause were applied to a
cessation of production clause. It must be mentioned, however, that the
lessees failed to argue that complete cessation was required in the sec-
ondary term to terminate the lease.
There are only two other cases, 43 also from Texas, which have ad-
dressed a question similar to the one discussed in Sullivan & Garnett.
Without citing Sullivan & Garnett, the Supreme Court of Texas ad-
dressed a similar issue in Clifton v. Koontz.44 The question in Clifton
was whether a marginal well45 produced quantities sufficient to satisfy
38. See notes 32 & 33 supra and accompanying text. Sullivan & Garnett has been distin-
guished from Roberts and Long in H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 616.1 (abr.
ed. 1975), where it was said: "The latter case [Sullivan & Garnett] is distinguishable from the
former two cases [Roberts and Long], however, in that the question arose in the latter cases with
reference to the secondary term of the lease and in the former cases with reference to the primary
term of the lease." Id at 331.
39. 308 S.W.2d at 892.
40. Id. at 891. The cessation of production clause stated:
If, after the expiration of the primary term of this lease, production on the leased
premises shall cease from any cause, Lessee shall have a period of sixty (60) days from
the stopping of production within which at his election, to commence operations for the
drilling of another well, deepen an existing well, or wells, or otherwise to attempt to
restore the production of such existing well or wells, and if such work is so commenced
and prosecuted with reasonable diligence and production results therefrom, this lease
shall remain in force so long as production continues.
Id at 894 (emphasis added).
41. Id at 893. Though the lessees testified that operating and administrative expenses should
have been allocated on an income basis, the jury determined cessation of paying quantities on a
per well basis. Id
42. Id at 893-94.
43. Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (rex. 1959); Wainright v. Wainright, 359 S.W.2d 628
(rex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref n.r.e.
44. 325 S.W.2d 684 (rex. 1959).
45. From June, 1955, through September, 1956, there was a net loss of $216.16. For the
months of July, August, and September, 1956, there was a net profit of $111.25, though there was a
loss for the consecutive months of April and May, 1956. 325 S.W.2d at 689. Because the well
produced in paying quantities and failed to produce in paying quantities, depending upon which
period of time was considered, the supreme court called the well a marginal well. Id.
[Vol. 16:71
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the cessation of production clause4 6 in the secondary term. This ques-
tion was narrower than the issue in Sullivan & Garnett. The supreme
court in Clifton not only defined production in the habendum clause to
mean paying production but defined paying production as well. Clifton
deviated from its earlier definition of production in paying quantities
pronounced in Garcia v. King.47 This departure was predicated on the
fact that the lessors in CIton, by application of the sixty-day cessation
of production clause, sought to compel the lessees to drill immediately
upon sustaining a slight loss for one month regardless of whether the
succeeding month's production might be profitable. Responding to the
lessor's contention, the court in Clifton said that by the terms of the
cessation of production clause, paying production could not be deter-
mined by applying an arbitrary sixty-day period, implemented before
cessation of production in paying quantities had actually been estab-
lished."8 The supreme court also said that where a marginal well was
involved the Garcia definition of paying quantities was too harsh on
lessees, and instead, production in paying quantities should be deter-
mined by how a reasonably prudent lessee would operate the well
under similar circumstances.49 The supreme court found that produc-
46. Id at 690. The cessation of production clause stated in part: "If after discovery of oil,
gas or other mineral theproduction thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not termi-
nate if lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations within sixty (60) days there-
after...." Id (emphasis added).
47. Id at 691. The definition of production in paying quantities in Garcia 1. King stated: "If
a well pays a profit, even small, over operating expenses, it produces in paying quantities, though
it may never repay its costs, and the enterprise as a whole may prove unprofitable." Id (quoting
Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1942)).
48. 325 S.W.2d 684. The supreme court said:
After cessation of production in paying quantities, the lessee has 60 days of "grace" in
which to save his leasehold, however, if production never ceased, as is the case here, the
60-day clause is not definitive of the period over which the trier of the facts must deter-
mine whether a lease is producing in paying quantities. There can be no arbitrary period
for determining the question of whether or not a lease has terminated for the additional
reason that there are various causes for slowing up of production, or temporary cessation
of production, which the courts have held to be justifiable. We again emphasize that
there can be no limit as to time, whether it be days, weeks, or months, to be taken into
consideration in determining the question of whether paying production from the lease
has ceased. To apply the 60-day clause as contended by petitioners would mean that
respondents would have been required to immediately commence drilling operations,
upon sustaining a slight loss for one month, without regard to whether they believed the
next month's production might be profitable for the reason that if they were in error and
suffered another slight loss, the lease would terminate.
Id at 690 (citations omitted).
49. Id at 690-91. The definition of production in paying quantities in Clifton v. Koontz
stated:
In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which paying
quantities is determined is whether or not after all the relevant circumstances a reason-
ably prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for
7
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tion in paying quantities had not ceased and did not need to interpret
the term production in the cessation of production clause. In dictum,
though, the court agreed with the lessor that the sixty-day cessation of
production clause applied where production in paying quantities had
ceased.50 The opinion in Clifton provides support, in dictum, for the
appellate court case of Sullivan & Garnett.
In Wainwright v. Wainwright,5' the Civil Appeals Court of Texas
declared a lease to be terminated by the express terms of the cessation
of production clause.52 The court in Wainwright distinguished Clifton
v. Koontz53 by pointing out that the facts in Wainwright involved a
question of complete and voluntary cessation, whereas the Cliton case
involved a question of production in paying quantities. As such, it was
only necessary for the court to define production in the cessation of
production clause to mean production, not paying production. Wain-
wright questioned the appellee's interpretation of Clfton which urged
that if a lessee shut down a well capable of paying production, it could
not be said that production had ceased as long as a reasonably prudent
lessee would have continued production. The court in Wainwright rea-
soned that such an interpretation would allow an imprudent lessee to
cease production of a well which had been producing in paying quanti-
ties for an indefinite period without termination of the lease. Wain-
wright rejected this interpretation of Clifton but agreed with the dictum
acknowledgement in Clion that the sixty-day clause would apply
where paying production had ceased.54 Therefore, the civil appeals
court in Wainwright, like the supreme court in Clifton, provided sup-
port, in dictum, to the rule established in the civil appeals court deci-
speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner in which the well in question was
operated.
Id
50. The supreme court said: "We agree with petitioners that if production in paying quanti-
ties ceased, the 60-day clause applies. However, the facts in the instant case compel a different
result than that contended for by petitioners." Id at 690.
51. 359 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref n.r.e.
52. The cessation of production clause stated in part:
It is specially agreed that in the event that oil or gas is being produced or is obtained
from said premises after the expiration of the primary term hereof and saidproduction
shall for any reason cease or terminate, lessee shall have the right at any time within
ninety (90) days from the cessation of such production to resume drilling operations in
the effort to make said leased premises againproduce oil or gas, in which event this lease
shall remain in force so long as such operations are continuously prosecuted. . . , and if
they result in production of oil or gas, so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from
the premises.
Id at 628-29 (emphasis added).
53. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
54. 359 S.W.2d at 630.
[Vol. 16:71
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sion of Sullivan & Garnett v. James.5 s
III. THE CASE OF HOYT v CONTINENTA4L OIL CO.
A. The Facts of the Case
With the oil and gas lease in its secondary term, the controversy in
Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co. 56 began when Hoyt, the lessor, made a de-
mand for a release of the leasehold interest 7 by the lessee, Continental
Oil Company. The lessee failed to comply with this demand. The
lease's thdreafter clause specified that the lease would remain in force
for as long thereafter as oil or gas was or could be produced. 8 The
lease also contained a sixty-day cessation of production clause which
provided in part: "If after expiration of the primary term. . . produc-
tion shall cease from any cause. . . this lease shall not terminate pro-
vided. . . lessee resumes operations for drilling ... within sixty days
from such cessation . . . ."59 The lease involved only one well, the
Hoyt well, which, during the twelve months60 under consideration, pro-
duced gas in non-paying quantities.6 '
Hoyt brought an action for the cancellation of the lease and for
damages resulting from the failure of the lessee to release the lease.62
55. 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref n.r.e.
56. 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980). Though there were two lessees other than Continental Oil Co.,
the lessees will hereinafter be referred to as the lessee, Continental Oil Co.
57. Hoyt also made an alternative demand for the further development and completion of an
offsetting well. Id at 562.
58. In its entirety the habendum clause stated: "This lease shall remain in force for a term of
ten years from April 25, 1956, and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gaso-
line, or any of the products covered by this lease is or can be produced." Brief-In-Chief at 4,
Answer Brief at 4, Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co., 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980).
The thereafter clause contains the phrase "or can be produced." Id Though this phrase did
not effect the question as to the interpretation of the term "produce" in the cessation of production
clause, the lessees did use it in their argument concerning the application of the shut-in gas well
doctrine to the Hoyt well. See note 67 infra.
59. In its entirety the cessation of production clause stated:
If after the expiration of the primary term of this lease, production on the leased
premises shall cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate provided lessee re-
sumes operations for drilling a well within sixty days from such cessation and this lease
shall remain in force during the prosecution of such operations and, ifproduction results
therefrom, then as long asproduction continues.
Brief-In-Chief at 4, Answer Brief at 5, Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co., 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980)
temphasis added).
60. Actually, production in paying quantities was not obtained for a period of fourteen
months but the last two of these months were not considered by the supreme court. See note 66
infra.
61. 606 P.2d at 562.
62. Hoyt sought damages for lessees' failure to release the leasehold interest that prevented
Hoyt from re-leasing the leasehold interest in addition to acquiring a commercial oil and gas well
on the property. Id
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The district court63 granted partial summary judgment on the cancella-
tion issue.' The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the partial sum-
mary judgment and remanded the case. 61
B. The Issues and Holdings in Hoyt
After dispensing with a minor issue,66 the supreme court in Hoyt
turned to answer the question whether the Hoyt well ceased production
for a period sufficient to actuate the sixty-day cessation of production
clause.67 The lessee contended that the term production in the cessa-
tion of production clause did not mean production in paying quantities
as is true in the habendum clause. 68 Hoyt, however, asserted that the
lease expired after the primary term under both the cessation of pro-
duction clause and the habendum clause because of the lessee's inabil-
63. The District Court for Dewey County, Oklahoma, Joe Young, J., presiding. Id at 560.
64. The lessee, Continental Oil Co., perfected an interlocutory appeal on the cancellation
issue, but the damages issue was never appealed. Id at 562.
65. Petition for rehearing before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was denied on March 3,
1980. The judgment of the supreme court was mandated on March 6, 1980. The controversy was
pursued no further;, the parties settled out-of-court on the damages issue.
66. By affidavit, Hoyt alleged that production in paying quantities had not been obtained for
fourteen consecutive months and claimed monetary losses for each month. Citing Jones v. Moore,
338 P.2d 872 (Okla. 1959) (oil and gas lessee could not be charged with the time between the
institution of a court injunction and the disposal of that injunction) the supreme court pointed out
that the last two of these months were after the filing date of the petition in this action and did not
constitute non-productive time for the purpose of this action since the filing of the proceeding put
the lessee's title at issue and relieved them of the covenant to produce in paying quantities until
determination could be made that title to the lease did indeed rest with Hoyt. 606 P.2d at 562.
67. The lessee also raised another factual issue-whether the Hoyt well was capable of a
quantity of production which could satisfy the habendum clause. Although the Hoyt well was
neither completed nor tested to the Cottage Grove formation (i.e., it was only completed to the
Morrow formation), lessee contended that cessation of production under the habendum clause did
not occur because the Cottage Grove formation was indeed capable of production. Additionally,
the lessee contended that its efforts in negotiating a gas purchase contract for the Cottage Grove
formation preserved the lease because it satisfied the requirement of diligence to obtain a market
for gas once discovered. 606 P.2d at 562-63. In short, the lessee contended that the shut-in gas
well doctrine had application to the Hoyt well. See generally H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW § 631 (abr. ed. 1975).
The lesssor, Hoyt, denied that the shut-in gas well doctrine extended the lease because the
Cottage Grove formation was neither completed nor tested. The supreme court, without finding it
necessary to decide whether there had been diligence to obtain a market, merely agreed with the
lessor that the shut-in gas well doctrine had no application where there had not been completion
of a gas well capable of paying production. 606 P.2d at 564 (citing State v. Carter Oil Co., 336
P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1959); McVicker v. Horn, Robinson, & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1958)). The
supreme court noted that the lessee's authorities, Gard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978), Flag
Oil Co. v. King Resources Co., 494 P.2d 322 (Okla. 1972), and Cox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 301 F.2d
122 (10th Cir. 1962), concerned wells which had been completed and tested and thus capable of
paying production. Moreover, the court was unable to find a single instance wherein a shut-in gas
well had not been completed and tested to be a commercial producer. 606 P.2d at 564-65.
68. 606 P.2d at 563. In other words, the lessee contended that the cessation of production
clause became actuated only where there was complete cessation of production.
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ity to produce in paying quantities. The supreme court found that in
Oklahoma, production had substantially the same meaning as produc-
tion in paying quantities in the habendum clause of an oil and gas
lease.69
The supreme court looked to the effect of the Hoyt lease's cessa-
tion of production clause upon the lease. The court found that in the
primary term, where the effect of the cessation of production clause was
to modify a clause other than the habendum clause, there was cessation
of production only if production totally ceased.70 Hoyt also examined
the effect of the cessation of production clause on a habendum clause in
a secondary term lease. In an instance of complete cessation of produc-
tion, the court found that a lease could be terminated by the express
terms of the cessation of production clause, without considering the
question of paying quantities.7' Where there was production, however,
the court found and emphasized that there was cessation of production
by the terms of the cessation of production clause if the habendum
clause required production in paying quantities and the lessee failed to
comply with that requirement.72 Furthermore, because the parties had
bargained for the sixty-day period, such a stipulated time period would
defeat the doctrine of temporary cessation allowing a reasonable time
for the lessee to restore paying production or, at least resume drilling
operations.73 Consequently, the lease terminated if paying production,
69. Id State v. Carter Oil Co., 336 P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1958).
70. Roberts v. Corum, 112 So.2d 550 (Miss. 1959); Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 89
N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 1958). The specific language of the supreme court which these cases are cited
as supporting is as follows:
If, as in the situation before us, production does not cease entirely but does cease to
be in paying quantities, there may or may not be such a cessation of production for
purposes of the cessation of production clause, depending upon whether or not the effect
is to modify the habendum or drilling clause. If the primary term has not expired so that
the effect of the cessation of production clause is to modify the drilling clause there is no
cessation of production unless that production ceases entirely.
606 P.2d at 563. Contra, Mitchell v. Brockenbush, 363 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref
n.r.e.
71. McQueen v. Sun Oil Co., 213 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1954); 606 P.2d at 563.
72. Wilson v. Talbert, 535 S.W.2d 807 (Ark. 1976); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.
1959); Wainright v. Wainright, 359 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref. n.r.e.; Sullivan &
Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref.r.e. The specific language of
the supreme court that these cases are cited as supporting is as follows: "The result is contrary
where, as here, the primary term has expired and the effect of the provision is to modify the
habendum clause. In such a situation there is a cessation of production if the habendum clause
requires production in paying quantities and such requirement is not met." 606 P.2d at 563.
See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
73. Haby v. Stanolind Oil Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Wilson v. Talbert, 535 S.W.2d
807 (Ark. 1976); Greer v. Salmon, 479 P.2d 294 (N.M. 1970); Lynch v. Southern Coast Drilling
Co., 442 S.W.2d 804 (rex. Civ. App. 1969), writ ref. mr.e.; Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Texaco, 417
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or an operation designed to restore paying production, was not re-
sumed within the sixty-day period.74 Hoyt held that, after the expira-
tion of the primary term, where a cessation of production clause
modified a habendum clause which required production in paying
quantities, then the oil and gas lease terminated if, once cessation of
production in paying quantities had been established, there was less
than production in paying quantities for more than the stipulated time
period of the cessation of production clause.
75
S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), writ refn.nr.e.; Hall v. McWilliams, 404 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966), writ ref n.r.e. 606 P.2d at 563. Of these authorities, Haby v. Stanolind, Greer P.
Salmon, and Wainright v. Wainright directly quote Woodson v. Pruett, 281 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955), writ ref. n.r.e where it was said:
Appellants next contend that the cessation of production on the lease was sudden and
only temporary, and that under such circumstances they were entitled to a reasonable
time in which to remedy the defect and resume production. This might be true under the
terms of some leases, but under the lease here the parties agreed and stipulated what
would constitute temporary cessation. The lease provides, in effect, that if production
should cease the lessee must commence re-working or additional operations within sixty
days or the lease would terminate. If the cessation of production is for more than sixty
consecutive days it is not to be regarded as temporary under the terms of this lease. If re-
working or additional operations are not begun within the sixty-day period the lease
terminates by its own provisions.
Id at 164-65. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Texaco, Hall v. McWilliams, and Lynch v. Southern Coast
Drilling Co. directly cite the civil appeals court case of Woodson v. Pruett, but Wilson v. Talbert
only indirectly cites that case by way of Haby v. Stanolind.
To emphasize the law in Woodson v. Pruett, the supreme court in Hoyt favorably quoted
George Hazlett who said:
The courts have been unanimous in construing this clause as meaning that cessation of
production for longer than the stipulated period cannot be considered "temporary." In
effect, the provision is construed as giving the lessee a fixed period of time within which
to resume production or commence additional drilling or reworking operations in order
to avoid termination of the lease; the period of grace having been fixed by agreement of
the parties, it cannot be extended by the courts, no matter what the circumstances or
cause of the cessation.
606 F.2d at 564 (quoting Hazlett, Effect of Temporary Cessation of Production on Leases and Term
Royalties, TENTH ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAx., 201, 248 (1959)). This comment by
Hazlett was made about a typical cessation of production clause which he constructed. See note
21 supra and accompanying text.
74. The lessee also contended that the negotiations in obtaining a new gas purchase contract,
and the internal corporate authorization to re-work the Hoyt well, constituted resumption of drill-
ing operations. On this point, the supreme court favorably quoted Professor Eugene Kuntz who
said:
The literal provisions of the clause in question will govern what type of operation must
be commenced or resumed. It may be limited in application to a resumption or com-
mencement of drilling, or it may be less restrictive and apply to reworking and other
operations. If the clause specifically provides for the resumption or commencement of
drilling, no other operation will satisfy the clause.
606 P.2d at 564 (quoting E. KuNTz, 4 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 47.5, at 134
(13th rev. ed. 1972)). To this effect, Professor Kuntz cited and quoted only Francis v. Pritchett,
278 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), writ ref.
75. See note 9 supra.
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF Hoyr v CONTINENTAL OIL CO.
A. Interpreting Production in the Cessation of Production Clause
In Hoyt, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined for the first
time that production in a cessation of production clause meant produc-
tion in paying quantities. The lessee argued against such an interpreta-
tion on the ground that it would rewrite the Hoyt lease to tle benefit of
the lessor. But construing an oil and gas lease liberally in favor of a
lessor and strictly against a lessee is encouraged as a matter of policy,
and this may especially be true where the question is whether an oil
and gas lease is in force. The fact that the lessor is a landowner and the
lessee is several corportions may only enhance this policy. The lessee's
basic argument, however, cogently advocated the policy of encouraging
the termination of an oil and gas lease by its terms.
The important distinction to be made in applying a policy which
encourages the termination of an oil and gas lease by its terms is the
difference between defining production before the expiration of the pri-
mary term and defining it after the expiration of that term. Interpreting
production in a cessation of production clause to mean any production
is appropriate in the primary term where a total cessation of production
rule provides a lessee with plenty of opportunity to explore and develop
the leasehold interest. In the secondary term, however, the cessation of
production clause modified the thereafter clause. Nevertheless, the les-
sees would have had the express wording of the cessation of production
clause control over the interpretation of production in the thereafter
clause. Consequently, as in the primary term, only total cessation of
production would have activated the cessation of production clause.
Such a rule would conceivably allow an imprudent lessee to lower pro-
duction to less than production in paying quantities for speculative rea-
sons. Preventing such speculation was a major reason for requiring
production in paying quantities in a secondary term lease which had no
cessation of production clause. The lessee, however, cited no authority
involving a secondary term lease to support such a construction of the
lease.7 6 The supreme court in Hoyt countered this argument by practi-
cally quoting Professor Eugene Kuntz who, unlike the supreme court,
cited only Sullivan & Garnett v. James77 in support of that language."8
76. But the lessee did cite Cities Service Oil Co. v. Geolograph Co., 254 P.2d 775 (Okla.
1953) (where a royalty clause was strictly construed). Brief-In-Chief at 12, Hoyt v. Continental
Oil Co., 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980).
77. 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), writ ref nar.e.
1980]
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It is not surprising that Sullivan & Garnett is the only case cited by
Professor Kuntz addressing the meaning of cessation of production in
the secondary term of an oil and gas lease containing a cessation of
production clause. The only support Clifton v. Koontz79 provides for
the result in Hoyt is derived from its speculative statement that a sixty-
day cessation of production clause has application where production in
paying quantities has ceased. Unlike Sullivan & Garnett, cessation of
paying production was not established in Clifton. The holding in
Wainright v. Wainright8° supports Hoyt only to the extent that it agrees,
in dictum, with the supreme court's dictum in Clifton. t The Supreme
Court of Arkansas, in the case of Wilson v. Talbert,82 provides no sup-
78. See notes 36, 70 & 72 supra and accompanying text.
79. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
80. 359 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref. n.r.e.
81. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
82. 535 S.W.2d 807 (Ark. 1976).
In Wilson v. Talbert, the decision involved two leases in their secondary terms concerning the
same well: the Haltom lease and the Talbert lease. The Haltom lease was to continue as long
thereafter as oil or gas was produced, but contained no cessation of production clause. The Tal-
bert lease was to continue as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced or drilling operations were
continuously prosecuted, and contained a sixty-day cessation of production clause and a force
majeure clause, see, E. KUNTZ, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.13(f) (12th rev.
ed. 1964) (discussion of theforce majeure clause). The controversy began in March, 1974, when a
leak developed in the bottom of one of the lessee's storage tanks and production for the well was
discontinued. 535 S.W.2d 807-08.
The lessees of the Haltom lease sought entry into the premises in July, 1974, to attempt to
repair the tank but Talbert refused them permission to enter. The trial court chancellor reached
the decision that the Haltom lease had not terminated due to the lessees' attempt within a reason-
able time to reinstate paying production upon temporary cessation of production. The chancel-
lor's decision was not appealed. 535 S.W.2d 808-09.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the chancellor's decision that the Talbert lease had
terminated. In reaching a decision, the chancellor cited authorities to the effect that the Talbert
lease terminated by the terms of its cessation of production clause. The supreme court pointed out
that the cessation of production clause referred only to permanent cessation situations. Continu-
ing, the court estblished that the force majeure clause was applicable because it applied to in-
stances of temporary cessation of production and provided no stipulated time period regarding
reinstatement of production or drilling operations. But the supreme court found that effort to
repair the rupture in the tank bottom had not been commenced by Talbert until approximately
four months after cessation, and that another storage tank had stood adjacent to the ruptured tank
and could quite easily have been used for storage of oil. Under the circumstances the supreme
court did not consider four months to be a reasonable time period under the doctrine of temporary
cessation. As such, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision though noting that the
chancellor had used the wrong reason in reaching the same conclusion. 535 S.W.2d 809-10.
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Talbert is not authority for the rule in
the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision of Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co. regarding termination of a
lease by the terms of a cessation of production clause where there is less than production in paying
quantities. The decision in Talbert was decided by the terms of aforce majeure clause, not a
cessation of production clause. Furthermore, even if the Arkansas Supreme Court had affirmed
the chancellor's reason for terminating of the Talbert lease by the terms of the cessation ofproduc-
tion clause, there is no mention of paying quantities in the chancellor's decision regarding the
Talbert lease. Such a decision would not have been unlike the decision in Wainright v. Wainright,
14
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port on this point although it was cited to that effect in the Hoyt opin-
ion.83 Authorities other than Sullivan & Garnett which were cited in
Hoyt as support on this point only provide, at best, dictum support.
Though Sullivan & Garnett's interpretation supports Hoyt's ruling,
and though the two cases are factually similar, Sullivan & Garnett does
have analytical faults. Unlike the court in Hoyt, Sullivan & Garnett did
not consider arguments advocating total cessation of prodtiction in the
secondary term. Furthermore, the court in Sullivan & Garnett failed to
substantively analyze the issue of paying production in the secondary
term. Perhaps because of Sullivan & Garnett's deficiencies, or perhaps
because facts did not provide the opportunities, the supreme court in
Hoyt failed to conclusively resolve important subsidiary issues.
B. Before the Activation of the Cessation of Production Clause in the
Secondary Term
With cessation of production in paying quantities an uncontro-
verted fact in Hoyt, the court substituted the terms of the cessation of
production clause for the doctrine of temporary cessation. As such, the
sixty-day period of the cessation of production clause controlled over
the reasonable time period allowed by the doctrine. Nevertheless, since
the question of paying quantities was not examined, the court did not
consider when the cessation of production clause would be activated by
cessation of production in paying quantities even though production
continued. In Sullivan & Garnett, the trial court found cessation of pro-
duction in paying quantities by defining production in paying quanti-
ties very much like it was defined in Garcia v. King. 4 But such a
definition may allow a cessation of production clause to be triggered six
months after cessation of production in paying quantities, as it was in
Sullivan & Garnett, or immediately after cessation of production in
paying quantities, as the lessor contended it should in Clifton. Applica-
tion of the sixty-day cessation of production clause would have re-
quired the lessees to immediately drill upon sustaining a slight loss for
359 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ ref n.r.e., where a secondary term lease terminated by
the express provisions of a cessation of production clause. But, unlike the civil appeals case of
Wainright P. Wainright, the supreme court case of Wilson v. Talbert does not even provide dictum
support for the rule in Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co. At best, the supreme court decision in Wilson v.
Talbert provides support for the rule in Woodson v. Pruett, 281 S.W.2d 159 (rex. Civ. App. 1955),
writ ref n.r.e., where it was held that a lease terminated by the express terms of a cessation of
production clause.
83. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
84. 164 S.W.2d 509 (rex. 1942).
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one month, without regard to whether the next month's production
might be profitable. The Supreme Court of Texas in Clifton attempted
to remedy this problem by substituting the general definition of pro-
duction in paying quantities with a definition intended to be less im-
posing on the lessees. But neither Clifton's special facts, nor the
rejection of a liberal interpretation of Clifton's reasonable operator rule
by the court in Wainright, should be forgotten. Clifton's rule may
merely be considered a remedy for the acrimonious nature of the defi-
nition of production in paying quantities found in Garcia v, King. In
Hoyt, though the supreme court did not have to determine when pro-
duction in paying quantities ceased as was true in Clifton and Sullivan
& Garnett, the language of the opinion explicitly indicates that the
sixty-day time period of the cessation of production clause tolled im-
mediately when cessation of paying production was established.
C. After the Activation of the Cessation of Production Clause in the
Secondary Term
The issue of paying quantities in Hoyt also raised the subsequent
question of what measure of time should prevail after cessation of pay-
ing production is established, before a lease may be terminated by the
cessation of production clause. With cessation of production in paying
quantities uncontroverted, Hoyt concluded, pursuant to the progeny of
Woodson v. Pruett,"5 that, instead of the reasonable time period al-
lowed by the doctrine of temporary cessation, the period stipulated in
the cessation of production clause would control the period over which
paying production would have to be re-established, or drilling opera-
tions resumed. Though cessation of production was established by a
jury in Sullivan & Garnett, the appeals court in that case reached the
same conclusion as the sdpreme court in Hoyt. But the practicality of
utilizing the period stipulated in a cessation of production clause as
time required to reinstate paying production, or resume drilling opera-
tions, were considered neither by the appeals court in Sullivan & Gar-
nett, nor the supreme court in Hoyt. The lessee's brief in support of a
petition for rehearing in Hoyt pointed out that by the time the profits
and losses for any particular month have been calculated, it is practi-
cally impossible to preserve a lease in the little time remaining under a
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sixty-day period.8 6 In Clifton, a pro-lessor decision, the Supreme Court
of Texas indirectly dealt with this problem. 7 It held that by the terms
of a cessation of production clause, paying could not be determined
under an arbitrary sixty-day period instituted before cessation of pay-
ing production had actually been established. But the supreme court in
Clifton stated only what measure of time could not be used before ces-
sation of production in paying quantities had been established. It
failed to specify what measure could be used before or after such cessa-
tion. Any question of the time period to be applied before a lease could
terminate under a cessation of production clause after cessation of pro-
duction is established was, at best, answered only partially by the
supreme court's opinion in Hoyt.
V. CONCLUSION
The holding in Hoyt concerning paying production in the secon-
dary term has reinforced the foundation upon which the rule in Sullivan
& Garnett stands, and it has increased the sphere of this rule to include
both Texas and Oklahoma. The effect of the supreme court's ruling is
to extend the holding in Sullivan & Garnett to the extent that an argu-
ment favoring a total cessation of production rule in the secondary
term has been considered and rejected. If not for the inevitable fact
that an imprudent lessee would take advantage of a total cessation rule
in the secondary term, a holding for the lessee in Hoyt would have
provided an easily ascertainable point from which the stipulated period
of time of a cessation of production clause would begin to run. It also
would have provided support against a rule requiring paying produc-
tion under a cessation of production clause in the secondary term and it
would have precluded uncertainties involved in determining when ces-
sation of paying production occurs. The court in Wainright echoed this
uncertainty when it rejected, in dictum, the lessee's interpretation of the
reasonable operator rule in Cliton which was used to define production
in paying quantities. Nevertheless, the total cessation of production
rule in the secondary term will be acceptable only when a secondary
term lessee producing less than paying quantities without completely
ceasing production is perceived as fair and prudent.
86. Brief of Appellants in Support of a Petition for Rehearing at 15, Hoyt v. Continental Oil
Co., 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980).
87. Note 50 supra and accompanying text. It was indirectly dealt with for the reason that,
unlike Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co. and Sullivan & Garnett v. James, cessation of production in
paying quantities was not established in Clifton v. Koontz.
1980]
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The language of the Hoyt opinion explicitly substitutes the sixty-
day period of the cessation of production clause for the reasonable time
period allowed at common law by the temporary cessation of produc-
tion doctrine. 8 At first glance, this language appears to favor the lessor
whether or not paying production is a factual issue. There are, how-
ever, at least three arguments which expose the pro-lessor facade of
Hoyt. First, in Sullivan & Garnett a definition of paying quantities was
arguably applied for a reasonable period of time. Specifically, this was
the first six months of the year in which the lease terminated and before
cessation of production in paying quantities was actually established.
Hoyt and Sullivan & Garnett are factually similar and stand for the
same rule. Consequently, it may be further argued that if the lessee in
Hoyt, like the lessees in Sullivan & Garnett, had not conceded that pay-
ing production had ceased, then the court in Hoyt could also have al-
lowed a reasonable period of time over which a definition of paying
quantities would have been applied to determine if paying production
had ceased.
Second, consistent with Cliton, it may be argued that paying pro-
duction should be defined by how a reasonably prudent operator would
operate the well under similar circumstances.89 Logically, everything a
reasonably prudent operator does is done within a reasonable time.
Consequently, if Hoyt had involved the factual question of when pro-
duction ceased to be in paying quantities, then applying Clfton's defi-
nition of paying quantities would have necessitated that a reasonable
period of time be allowed over which cessation of production in paying
quantities would be determined. Obviously, both the argument derived
from Sullivan & Garnett, and the argument derived from Clifton, are
for the purpose of allowing a reasonable time over which a definition of
paying quantities may be applied to determine if cessation of paying
production has occurred.9"
88. The supreme court stated:
On this point the record clearly demonstrates production in paying quantities was not
obtained for an uninterrupted period far in excess of the 60-day provision in the lease
executed by the parties. Where the parties have bargained for and agreed on a time
period for a temporary cessation clause that provision will control over the common law
doctrine of temporary cessation allowing a "reasonable time" for resumption of drilling
operations.
606 P.2d at 563 (citations omitted).
89. It must not be forgotten that Clifton is factually distinguishable from Sullivan & Garnett.
See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
90. But in order for the effect of each argument to be consistent with the Hoyt opinion, it
would be necessary that a reasonable time period for determining cessation of paying production
precede the common law doctrine of temporary cessation. The common law doctrine, which be-
[Vol. 16:71
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The third argument which exposes the pro-lessor facade of Hoyt
concerns the measure of time to be used once cessation of production in
paying quantities has been established. It may be argued that the arbi-
trary time period of a cessation of production clause does not allow
enough time for the lessee to preserve the lease and, therefore, such a
time period should be judicially replaced by a longer time period, if not
a reasonable time period. The difficulty in making such an argument
would be the counter-argument, based upon the rule in Woodson v.
Pruett,9' that the expressed intent of the parties to the lease must not be
re-written by the courts. This argument was basically accepted by the
Hoyt court; the court rejected the lessee's argument that the sixty-day
time period of the cessation of production clause did not allow enough
time to preserve the lease after cessation of paying production had been
established.9" Moreover, it must not be forgotten that both Clifton and
Wainright stated, in dictum, that once cessation of production is estab-
lished, the stipulated period of time of the cessation of production
clause is the measure of time to be applied before the lease terminates
pursuant to the cessation of production clause. Consequently, this
third argument probably has less chance of success than the first two
arguments, which are derived from Clifton and Sullivan & Garnett.93
gins with the establishment of cessation of paying production, also allows for a reasonable time
period for the operator to restore any production in less than paying quantities to paying produc-
tion. Consequently, it would be possible for a lessee to have two consecutive reasonable time
periods in which to preserve an oil and gas lease. The first reasonable time period would be the
time over which a definition of paying quantities would be applied to determine if there is paying
production; the second reasonable time period would allow the lessee time to restore any cessation
of paying production, or resume drilling operations.
91. 281 S.W.2d 159 (rex. Civ. App. 1955), writ ref. n.r.e.
92. This seems contradictory since, on the one hand, the terms of the cessation of production
clause are said to control over the common law doctrine of temporary cessation. On the other
hand, however, the court interprets production in the cessation clause to mean production in pay-
ing quantities, not just production.
93. Note that an argument concerning the application of a reasonable time period over which
cessation of production in paying quantities may be determined is not an argument for substitut-
ing the arbitrary time period of a cessation of production clause with a longer period of time, if
not a reasonable time period. If one of these two arguments is successful, it may be difficult to
effectively assert the other because the two consecutive reasonable time periods might appear to be
too favorable to a lessee where policy interests suggest that the needs of the lessor should be
looked after first.
A fourth argument might be that the terms of the cessation of production clause are con-
trolled by other provisions of the lease under certain conditions. Thus, aforce majeure clause of
an oil and gas lease controlled over a cessation of production clause, similar to the cessation of
production clause in Hoyt, in instances of temporary cessation even though the cessation of pro-
duction clause had application to cessation of production resulting from either temporary or per-
manent cessation. Wilson v. Talbert, 535 S.W.2d 807 (Ark. 1976). The effect of theforce majeure
clause was to restore the common law doctrine of temporary cessation to allow a reasonable time
period over which production could be restored.
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The rule in Hoyt will probably be followed in other jurisdictions
which define the term "production" in a habendum clause to mean pro-
duction in paying quantities.94 But because cessation of paying pro-
duction was an uncontroverted fact in Hoyt, successful arguments
favoring the application of a reasonable period of time over which a
definition of paying quantities may be applied will, at least, soften the
pro-lessor rule in Hoyt to the benefit of a lessee in future litigation.
Obviously, such arguments cannot be made if cessation of production
in paying quantities is conceded by a lessee. Furthermore, a successful
argument favoring the substitution of the arbitrary time period of a
cessation of production clause with a longer time period, if not a rea-
sonable time period, will have the same effect upon the rule in Hoyt.
Consequently, because the Hoyt opinion thoroughly rejected an argu-
ment favoring a total cessation of production rule in the secondary
term, these arguments should not be ignored by a lessee who finds him-
self in the same predicament as the lessee in Hoyt.
Steven L. Holcombe
94. See notes 28 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
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